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Expeditionary Helicopter Sea Combat Squadrons (HSC) operate on Navy 
amphibious assault ships to provide search and rescue (SAR), logistics and 
combat support. When embarked, the detachments are the primary SAR asset 
and have requirements levied upon them by NAVAIR 00-80T-106 to maintain 
aircraft SAR readiness postures in support of ship and embarked Marine Corps 
aircraft operations.  
The goal of this study was to identify what impacts would occur to flight 
support personnel effectiveness if OPNAV 3710.7U sleep requirements were 
deviated from in order to meet minimum personnel requirements. The conclusion 
reached was that safety concerns are present when OPNAV 3710.7U sleep 
requirements for flight support personnel are violated to maintain NAVAIR 00-
80T-106 operational requirements. The study found that worker effectiveness 
varies systematically with the duration of sleep interruption encountered. 
Minimum predicted effectiveness comes at three hours with the predicted values 
at two, three and four hours being essentially equal.  When sleep interruptions 
exceed 1.55 hours, effectiveness levels drop below 70%, equivalent to 
experiencing a .08 BAC. A model for subsequent interruptions over the preceding 
days found that worker effectiveness varies systematically with the number of 
days between interruptions. The effect of sleep interruptions of multiple nights 
was greatest two days between interruptions. A minimum of four to five days 
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Historically, expeditionary Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadrons 
operate in independent detachments on board Naval Amphibious Assault ships, 
LHA and LHD class, providing search and rescue (SAR), logistics, special 
warfare and surface warfare support for both the ship and embarked Marine 
Corps aircraft and personnel. These detachments consist of two MH-60S 
helicopters, six pilots, six aircrew and 18 flight support personnel, making roughly 
30 personnel in each detachment.  
As a ship support asset, the detachment’s schedule is dictated by the 
operational timeline and tasking of the ship and the USMC Air Combat Element 
(ACE). Due to the limited number of personnel in a detachment, and the dynamic 
nature of their operation, the detachment must remain flexible in its operational 
capability. Often SAR support is required, either airborne or in an alert condition, 
for consecutive 24-hour periods, which requires 24-hour maintenance support. 
The detachment’s ability to meet these operational requirement is reliant on 
detachment manning, in both the domains of manpower (i.e. the number of 
people in the workforce) and personnel (i.e the qualification level of the 
workforce).  
An inability to conduct maintenance with the proper qualifications and 
manpower, as dictated by COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2B Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Program (NAMP), is detrimental to aircraft maintenance, safety, 
and ultimately, will result in aircraft that are not mission capable. In manpower 
and personnel deficient situations, when aircraft must still be mission capable, 
something must be traded so that the appropriately qualified people are present 
to conduct maintenance as dictated by governing directive.  When faced with the 
decision to cancel operations, violate maintenance and safety protocols, or have 





maintenance, the decision for flight support personnel to forego sleep is often 






A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the Navy’s instructions highlights two documents which are 
relevant to framing HSC detachment operational requirements and flight support 
personnel sleep requirements: NAVAIR 00-80T-106 LHA/LHD NATOPS and 
OPNAV 3710.7U NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions.  
NAVAIR 00-80T-106 LHA/LHD NATOPS defines the mission and scope of HSC 
detachment operations with respect to LHA/LHD operations.  
 
8.1.1 SAR Detachment Helicopter 
When at sea, the SAR detachment helicopter shall be maintained, 
during daylight hours and when operationally feasible, in Condition 
IV for SAR/MEDEVAC contingencies. A SAR crew shall be 
designated and promulgated in the air plan. The designated crew 
shall remain the duty SAR crew until properly relieved by another 
crew; brief and preflight complete. The helicopter may be utilized 
for local administrative, logistic, or training functions while in 
standby status. The embarked squadron/detachment should 
assume SAR/MEDEVAC standby whenever the ship's SAR 
detachment helicopter is not operationally ready. (Department of 
the Navy, 2013b) 
 
Overall, the above requirement in NAVAIR 00-80T-106 8.1.1 stipulates 
that one SAR-capable aircraft must be maintained in at least Condition IV status 
unless not operationally feasible. The definition of “not operationally feasible” is 
broad and open to interpretation and the commanding officer’s discretion. It is the 
detachment’s responsibility to determine its aircraft’s readiness and capabilities 







When operational SAR mission capability is required from the detachment 
for various LHA/LHD operations and ACE sorties, at a minimum one aircraft must 
be maintained in an upgraded condition status as noted in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. SAR Helicopter Requirements derived from NAVAIR 00-80T-106 
Operation Type 
Requirements for 






Tiltrotor or V/STOL 
Condition II or 
Airborne* 
Condition I or 
Airborne 
Troop Lift Airborne* Airborne 
* SAR equipped helicopter 
does not require automatic 
hover capability 
   
 
NAVAIR 00-80T-106 defines the condition/alert status of the SAR helicopter as: 
 
5.1.7.1 Condition I/Alert 5 
The helicopter shall be spotted for immediate launch with rotor 
blades spread, starting equipment plugged in, and the LSE and 
starting crewman and ordnance personnel ready for launch in all 
respects. When the word is passed to “Standby for launch,” 
engines shall be started without further instructions; however, 
launch shall be positively controlled from PriFly. Aircraft should be 
airborne within 5 minutes of order to launch. 
5.1.8.2 Condition II/Alert 15 
All provisions for Condition I apply, except that flightcrews are not 
required in the aircraft. They shall, however, be on the flight deck 
near their aircraft or inside the island structure at the flight deck 
level. 
5.1.7.3 Condition III/Alert 30 
Main rotor blades may be folded and the helicopter need not be in 
position for immediate launch; however, it must be parked so as to 
allow direct access to a suitable launch spot. A towbar shall be 





handling crew, and starting crewman shall be designated and 
assigned to each helicopter. 
These personnel must be thoroughly briefed, so that when the 
order is given to prepare to launch, the helicopter can be safely and 
expeditiously moved into position and readied for launch. 
Flightcrews shall be in the ready rooms or working spaces, in flight 
gear, and prebriefed for the launch. Aircraft should be airborne 
within 30 minutes of order to launch. 
5.1.7.4 Condition IV/Alert 60 
The condition of the helicopter is similar to Condition III, except that 
minor maintenance may be performed if no restoration delay is 
involved. The aircrew shall be designated and available. Aircraft 
should be airborne within 60 minutes of order to launch. 
(Department of the Navy, 2013b) 
 
Often, multiple helicopter, multiple tilt-rotor, VSTOL and troop lift 
operations are conducted over a prolonged period of time in continuous cycles 
over a 24-hour period. An example of such an operation would be continuous 24-
hour Harrier airstrikes into a country, amphibious landings, or large troop 
movements that can last for multiple weeks. In such an operating environment, 
requiring 24-hour SAR support, detachments must operate continuously to 
maintain the readiness of their aircraft. Routine aircraft maintenance must be 
performed on one aircraft in its off-cycle periods while the other is airborne or in 
an alert condition. This situation requires maintenance to be moved into a 24-
hour cycle traditionally broken into a two-shift 12-hour work rotation. 
HSC detachments are historically manned with one work center 
maintainer qualified as a collateral duty quality assurance representative 
(CDQAR) and collateral duty inspector (CDI), and a second work center 
maintainer who is an unqualified worker. In some instances, the second worker 
will also be qualified a CDI but this is not common. For reference, a CDQAR is 
fully qualified in their maintenance work center and a CDI is an intermediate 





conduct two 12-hour maintenance shifts over a 24-hour period, it must possess a 
CDI and CDQAR on each shift, which can be the same person. When this 
manning level is not possible, the qualified CDI/CDQAR may be tasked during 
their off shift period to work on the aircraft to maintain aircraft operational 
capability. 
 OPNAV 3710.7U NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions is an 
often overlooked document when it comes to aircraft maintainers as it is primarily 
directed at Naval Aviators and Naval Aircrewmen. Yet, OPNAV 3710.7U pertains 
to the framing of this paper because it clearly defines limits to maintainer’s (flight 
support personnel) work periods and minimum required sleep periods.  
 
8.3.2.1.1 Crew Rest for Flight Crew and Flight Support Personnel  
Crew rest is the non-duty time before a flight duty period begins. 
Crew rest includes free time for meals, transportation and rest and 
must include an opportunity for 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep time 
for every 24-hour period. Crew rest does not begin until after 
termination of official duties and is required prior to reporting for   
preflight preparations. Flight crew should not be scheduled for 
continuous alert and/or flight duty (required awake) in excess of 18 
hours. If it becomes necessary to exceed the 18-hour rule, 15 hours 
of continuous off-duty time shall be provided prior to scheduling the 
member for any flight duties. Flight and ground support personnel 
schedules shall be made with due consideration for watch standing, 
collateral duties, training, and off-duty activities. Crew rest can be 
reduced to less than 12 hours in order to maintain a 24-hour 
work/rest schedule, but a shortened crew rest period (for example 
to maintain circadian rhythm) must always include an opportunity 
for 8-hours of uninterrupted sleep. (Department of the Navy, 2009) 
 
OPNAV 3710.7U clearly delineates that crew rest for flight support 
personnel must include eight hours of uninterrupted sleep time for every 24-hour 
period. It goes so far as to say that crew rest can be limited to less than 12 hours, 





B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Violations of the minimum eight hour sleep period do occur in order to 
maintain aircraft availability when a CDI/CDQAR is required during 24-hour 
maintenance cycles. Due to the sleep requirement and lack of two maintainers 
qualified CDI and CDQAR in each work center, it can be argued that HSC 
detachments are not manned to maintain a 24-hour maintenance posture. How 
effective and safe is the work being conducted when OPNAV 3710.7U sleep 
requirements are not followed? What is the impact to worker effectiveness when 
a worker is awakened on a given night? How many nights must pass before the 
worker returns to their baseline effectiveness level and how do subsequent sleep 
interruptions on preceding nights affect this recovery? 
This paper quantifies the impacts to maintainer effectiveness as well as 
the safety concerns that result from undermanning in the domains of manpower 
and personnel in HSC detachments. The framework of this study is presented in 
consideration to OPNAV 3710.7U crew rest requirements for flight support 
personnel and the operational requirements levied by the NAVAIR 00-80T-106, 






Data for this study was based upon ten simulated work/rest schedules 
which represent possible scenarios which could be encountered when a CDQAR 
or CDI is required to conduct or review maintenance for their work center during 
off shift periods. In these cases, the assumption is made that no other qualified 
individual is available and the work is required in order for aircraft to be 
operational. 
A. DATA ENTRY 
The Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) version 3.2.01 from Nova 
Scientific Corporation, located at http://www.novasci.com/, and licensed to the 
Naval Postgraduate School was used to conduct the analysis. A baseline 
analysis was conducted to establish a four-week period of shift work from 0600-
1800 and crew rest from 1800-0600. A sleep pattern was established from 2100-
0500 for the requisite eight hours of uninterrupted sleep. In FAST, the sleep 
condition was set as fair to simulate the sleep conditions encountered in naval 
standard berthing on an operational ship.  
Ten simulations were conducted to quantify the impact to maintainer 
effectiveness when the eight hours of sleep was interrupted against the baseline 
model. The interruptions were initiated at the same time, 0000, beginning on the 
Monday of the fourth week and on subsequent days of that week also at 0000. 
The interruptions were scheduled for various lengths of time to simulate various 
workloads as well as on succeeding days to simulate repeated tasking.  The goal 
of this pattern was to measure the level of effectiveness during the interruption 
period as well as to measure the amount of time required for the effectiveness 
levels to return to the baseline pattern.  Figures 1-10 show the data entry for the 






Figure 1. Simulation 1 (Baseline), 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 8 hours of sleep in 
fair conditions (2100-0500).  
 
 
Figure 2. Simulation 2, 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 7 hours of sleep in fair 
conditions (2100-0500), Monday 1 hour awake (0000-0100). 
 
Figure 3. Simulation 3, 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 6 hours of sleep in fair 






Figure 4. Simulation 4, 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 5 hours of sleep in fair 
conditions (2100-0500), Monday 3 hours awake (0000-0300). 
 
Figure 5. Simulation 5. 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 4 hours of sleep in fair 
conditions (2100-0500), Monday 4 hours awake (0000-0400). 
 
Figure 6. Simulation 6, 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 7 hours of sleep in fair 
conditions (2100-0500), Monday 1 hour awake (0000-0100). 12-hour shift (0600-








Figure 7. Simulation 7, 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 7 hours of sleep in fair 
conditions (2100-0500), Monday 1 hour awake (0000-0100). 12-hour shift (0600-




Figure 8 Simulation 8, 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 7 hours of sleep in fair 
conditions (2100-0500), Monday 1 hour awake (0000-0100). 12-hour shift (0600-




Figure 9. Simulation 9, 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 7 hours of sleep in fair 
conditions (2100-0500), Monday 1 hour awake (0000-0100). 12-hour shift (0600-








Figure 10. Simulation 10, 12-hour shift (0600-1800), 7 hours of sleep in fair 
conditions (2100-0500), Monday 1 hour awake (0000-0100). 12-hour shift (0600-
1800), 7 hours of sleep in fair conditions (2100-0500), Saturday 1 hour awake 
(0000-0100). 
 
Blue grids represent periods of sleep in 15 minute increments, black grids 
represent periods of work in 15 minute increments, and clear grids represent 
personal time in 15 minute increments. By creating a standardized sleep pattern 
over a 21 day period before the interruptions, the FAST tool stabilized into a 
circadian rhythm for the interruption testing. 
B. MEASUREMENT PARAMETERS AND TESTING 
Minimum predicted effectiveness levels were measured at the lowest point 
of effectiveness during the interruption period in both percent effectiveness, from 
the left Y axis of the FAST display, as well as in comparative blood alcohol 
content (BAC), from the right Y axis of the FAST display. The measured point 
was marked with a data marker to provide detail. The FAST Baseline display with 






Figure 11. Simulation 1, Baseline FAST Analysis Plot with descriptors. 
 
 
Minimum effectiveness levels across Simulations One through Five were 
analyzed in a polynomial regression to determine the amount of effectiveness 
drop as a condition of duration of sleep interruption. The independent variable 
was the duration of the interruption. For Simulations One through Five, this 
duration was zero to four hours. The dependent variable was the minimum 
effectiveness level achieved for the interruption period. Minimum effectiveness 
levels across Simulations Two and Six through Ten were analyzed in a 
polynomial regression to determine on which day the cumulative effects of the 
interruptions was worst as well as the minimum number of days between 
interruptions in which there were no compounding affects from the previous 
interruption. The independent variable used for this calculation was number of 
days between interruptions with Simulation Two being entered with zero days 
between interruptions and Simulations Six through Ten being one to five days 
between interruptions. The dependent variable was the minimum effectiveness 








A. PREDICTED EFFECTIVENESS AFTER SINGLE NIGHT AWAKENING 
The FAST analysis results for Simulations Two through Five can be seen 
in Figures 12-15. Note the points of sleep interruption and the drop in 
effectiveness upon awakening. This point, minimum effectives, is marked with a 
data marker providing amplifying information. 
 
 







Figure 13. Simulation 3 FAST Analysis Plot. 
 
 







Figure 15. Simulation 5 FAST Analysis Plot. 
 
Table 2 and Figure 16 represent the data collected from these analyses.  
 
Table 2. Single Night Effectiveness 
Simulation 
# Hours of interruption (x) 
%Minimum 
Effectiveness (y) 
1 0 75 
2 1 70 
3 2 70 
4 3 69 
5 4 69 
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The statistical analysis of single night effectiveness levels conducted in 
Microsoft Excel 2013 shows that the percentage of effectiveness varies 
systematically with the duration of sleep interruption. The best fit model is 
quadratic:  Yhat = 74.48+-3.87 x + .64 x^2. R2 = .90, F(2, 2) = 9.02, p < .05.  The 
linear term (-3.87) accounts for the sharp drop from zero to one hour of 
interruption. The quadratic term (+.64) dampens the sharp drop.  Because of this 
effect, additional hours of interruption do not have as much effect as does the 
first hour.  The minimum predicted effectiveness level is observed at three hours 
with the predicted values at two, three and four hours being essentially equal. 
The equation cannot be extrapolated beyond four hours of interruption. FAST 
reports that an effectiveness level of 70% equates to a BAC of .08. Predicted 
effectiveness levels drop below the 70% level, where BAC equivalent exceeds 
.08, at 1.55 hours of interruption. 
 
B. PREDICTED EFFECTIVENESS AFTER MULTIPLE NIGHT 
AWAKENINGS  
The FAST analysis results for Simulations Two through Five can be seen 
in Figures 17-21. Note the effect of the first interruption on the second 
interruption. The point of minimum effectiveness is marked with a data marker 






Figure 17. Simulation 6 FAST Analysis Plot. 
 
 








Figure 19. Simulation 8 FAST Analysis Plot. 
 
 






Figure 21. Simulation 10 FAST Analysis Plot. 
 
Table 3 and Figure 22 represent the data collected from these analyses.  
 
Table 3. Multi Night Effectiveness 
Simulation 




2 0 (M) 70 
6 1 (M,T) 68 
7 2 (M,W) 68 
8 3 (M,TH) 69 
9 4 (M,F) 70 







Figure 22. Multiple Night Effectivness Plot of Data Points and Regression 
The statistical analysis of the multiple night effectiveness levels conducted 
in Microsoft Excel 2013 shows that the percentage of effectiveness varies 
systematically with the number of days between interruptions. The best fit model 
is quadratic: Yhat = 69.5+-1.05X+.25X^2. R2 = .90, F(2, 2) = 9.02, p < .05.  The 
linear term (-1.05) accounts for the initial decrease from zero to two days 
between interruptions. The quadratic term (+.25) dampens out and overcomes 
the negative slope, creating a positive slope after two days. Interruption effects 
on effectiveness levels are maximized at two days between interruptions. The 
lack of compounding effects from the first interruption to the second occurs four 
to five days between interruptions. At this point, the effects of sleep interruptions 
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Interruptions to sleep have significant impacts on effectiveness. A worker 
who is awakened to conduct maintenance begins that work at 71% of max 
effectiveness and after 1.55 hours awake is operating at a predicted 
effectiveness level equal to that of an individual with 0.08% BAC. The impact of a 
single one hour sleep interruption has a residual impact to effectiveness for four 
to five days after the event occurs with cumulative effects peaking at two days 
between interruptions. The ability to maintain OPNAV 3710.7U sleep 
requirements for flight support personnel is critical to ensuring that safe and 
effective maintenance is being performed on the aircraft.  
Equally important to OPNAV 3710.7U sleep requirements is the ability to 
maintain NAVAIR 00-80T-106 operational requirements, all of which center on a 
detachment’s capability to operate safe and effective 24-hour continuous 
maintenance. To balance the domains of Human Systems Integration (HSI), 
primarily safety and personnel in the face of operational requirements, solutions 
can be found in the HSI domains of manpower, training.’ and human factors 
engineering.  
From the domain of human factors engineering, aircraft could be 
redesigned to reduce complexity and allow a less qualified maintainer to conduct 
maintenance. Such a solution would be best analyzed in a follow-on comparative 
study to assess the design and production costs against the projected manpower 
cost savings. 
From the domains of manpower, personnel, and training, to increase the 
number of qualified personnel on detachments, squadrons could either increase 
training for their current manning in order to increase qualifications levels, or 
augment their manning to bring in more qualified personnel, or they could do 





qualification level to CDQAR, or at a minimum CDI, the ability to maintain 24-
hour continuous maintenance would greatly increase. Workload and knowledge 
base would be better distributed amongst the two members of the work center 
and the detachment would be less dependent on a single CDQAR/CDI, 
eliminating a single point of failure when conducting maintenance in many 
circumstances. Manpower at the squadron level would need to be capable of 
supporting the increased training requirements while still maintaining their current 
detachment manning capability. A follow-on study would be required to 
determine if current manpower is sufficient to support both the increased training 
and detachment manning. 
By augmenting the manpower to bring in more qualified maintainers, 
squadrons could staff two CDQARs, or at a minimum, one CDQAR and one CDI 
in each detachment work center. This adjustment would be a temporary, but not  
long-term, solution. Such a solution would not be viable in the long-term with a 
limited pool of qualified personnel from which to draw. Eventually, the surplus 
talent pool would be eliminated and the system would revert to its current state. 
A compromise solution would be a balance between the two solutions. 
Manpower could be initially augmented to increase the number of qualified 
personnel to train the unqualified personnel and equip detachments. Once 
enough personnel have been trained, the system should be able to sustain itself 
without subsequent manpower augmentations. Such a compromise would 
resolve the feasibility problem of the training solution and the lack of long-term 
solvency in the manpower solution. A follow-on study would be required to 
determine the size and associated cost of the initial manpower increase. 
A quantifiable problem exists for HSC detachments. Worker effectiveness 
at the levels predicted by FAST for sleep interruptions is unsafe for conducting 
maintenance. OPNAV and NAVAIR requirements cannot be maintained by the 





one needs further research to determine their viability. Until these issues are 
addressed at the OPNAV/PERS level, the interim recommendations based on 
this study that can be implemented at the squadron and detachment level are:  
a) Only interrupt OPNAV sleep requirements in emergency situations 
when the consequences of not doing so outweigh the safety risk associated with 
decreased maintainer effectiveness;  
b) Allow at a minimum four to five days of full eight hour sleep periods for 
recovery to eliminate compounding effects.  
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